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In this article we argue that social science education needs to convey more than operational mechanisms of society. 
Especially in socio-economic education, questions of business ethics, i.e. phenomena of economics and society need 
to be integrated and reflected, decidedly focusing on the moral content of economics. With the introduction of 
economic citizenship as the ideal economic actor to be the purpose of economic education, this paper proposes that 
economic education needs to connect economic expertise and moral judgment and should also allude to the necessity 
of every market action’s conditional legitimization by society. 
We propose to discuss different ‘sites’ of morality as a heuristic approach to the different areas of economic 
responsibility. The individual, organizational and political level of responsibility helps to categorize the different moral 
issues of economic activity and serves as a great pattern to explain economic relations to scholars and students. 
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1 Introduction: Socio-economic education from a 
business ethics perspective 
Economic and employment systems play an increasingly 
important role in modern societies; as (re)producers of 
social disparity, they take accountability for the 
distribution of economic goods and determine the 
amount of individual societal participation. Thus, eco-
nomic operational competence constitutes an invaluable 
basis for any self-determined lifestyle concerning 
changes of status as well as everyday life. It is therefore 
crucial not to reduce these systems to abstracts beyond 
social reality, but to conceive them as culturally 
embedded societal subsystems. Such interconnected sys-
tems always cause conflicts, dilemmas and structural 
problems in their interpenetration zones (cf. Göbel 2006, 
p. 79), i.e., their intersections with adjacent subsystems 
(e.g., politics, legislation, education, etc.). In the follo-
wing, we argue that those phenomena—within the scope 
of school education—need to be reflected from a 
perspective beyond an analysis of simple operational 
mechanisms, decidedly focusing on the moral content. 
Socio-economic education and issues of business ethics 
are therefore very closely connected. If (conventional) 
socio-economics wants to apply to imparting economic 
and social expertise, then business ethics accompanies 
this via reflecting the development of socio-economic 
rationality.  
The genuine contribution of business ethics is to endow 
this guidance as a “critical reflection authority“
1
 (Ulrich, 
Maak 1996, p. 15), and to offer explanatory discourses 
regarding values, purposes, principles and extra-econo-
mic framework requirements to both lecturers and 
learners of socio-economic education. This is meant to 
include those issues and aspects which are shunned by 
“pure“ economics in order for it to be acknowledged as a 
value-free, descriptive science. We hold the view that 
the separation of ethics and economics, of explanatory 
and applicational discourses, is artificial, and that the 
two-world-conception of value-free economic rationale 
on the one hand and “extra-economic“ ethics on the 
other hand can be transcended by a socio-economic 
education. In this regard, ULRICH (2005a, p. 6) points 
out: “Thus, we do not have a choice between a value-
free or an ethical perspective on economic activity, but 
only a choice between a reflected or unreflected dealing 
with the inevitable normativity of every statement 
concerning issues of reasonable economic activity. Every 




This essay discusses socio-economic education from a 
business ethics point of view. Generally speaking, we 
consider every person involved in economic inter-rela-
tions (consumer, investor, entrepreneur, executive or 
member of an organization) to be a beneficiary of this 
education. It needs to be embedded into the general 
school system, since relatively young students already 
take on the role of economic subjects or develop ideas 
about economic activity during their occupational orien-
tation or via decisions regarding consumption and saving. 
During tertiary and quaternary education, socio-
economic contents of teaching gain importance along 
with the increase of potential role models (entre-
preneurs, employees, executives, etc.). 
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Special attention is given to the location within the 
theoretical construct of integrative economic ethics (cf. 
Ulrich 2008, 2010), which ascribes particular advertence 
to the individual and his or her responsibility—in contrast 
to rather economic approaches to morality (e.g., 
Homann, Lütge 2005; Homann, Home-Drees 1992) that 
focus on the institutional order as the systematic 
location of morality. Although moral failure of leadership 
and management—a typical issue of individual ethics—is 
a noticeable concern in recent public perception
3
, busi-
ness ethics as a scientific discipline has not dealt with 
issues of individual education until recently. However, 
earlier dealings with integrative economic ethics have led 
to a systematic introduction to business ethics education 
for teachers (cf. Ulrich, Maak 1996) as well as socio-
economics in general and socio-economic education in 
particular (cf. Ulrich 2003, 2005a, 2007). We will examine 
the didactic implementation towards the end of this 
article. 
The following explanations are to shed light on a realm 
of socio-economic education that has rarely been 
highlighted so far, namely the normative foundations of 
every form of economic education.  
 
2 Civic spirit, mythbusting and ethical expertise – 
conceptualizing the idea of the economic citizen 
An orderly society and a beneficial market economy need 
actors whose unbowed self-conception includes being 
economically active while conditionally legitimized as 
part of a surrounding societal system. Under these 
prerequisites, socio-economic education must not aim 
for the creation of unconditionally efficient and 
privatistic economic actors, whose degrees of freedom 
are only limited by natural and political restrictions.  
Rather, an understanding of the liberal-republican ethos 
of an economic citizen is required that ties economic 
activity to civic virtues and moral faculties of judgment. 
This notion is legitimized through the well-founded 
assumption that people have always been growing up 
within a society—therefore, neither nature nor any 
thought experiments are necessary to account for moral 
duties. Instead, regarding discourse ethics, one does well 
and acts correctly if he puts his actions up for discussion 
among the parties affected to show his concern about 
the legitimacy and social approval of his actions. From 
this point of view, an action is legitimate if it can be 
potentially identified by everyone as generalizable, i.e., if 
it is impartially justifiable towards everyone. It is the 
“basic tenet of discourse ethics” that “[o]nly those norms 
can claim to be valid that meet (or could meet) with the 
approval of all affected in their capacity as participants in 
a practical discourse.” (Habermas 1991, p. 66)  
Economic citizens then are “economic subjects who do 
not separate their business acumen from their civic 
spirit, i.e., their self-conception as ‘good citizens’, but 
integrate both” (Ulrich 2005b, p. 14 – cf. Ulrich 2008, p. 
283) in a community of free and equal citizen. Here, 
“business acumen“ means the knowledge of the 
(market̶)economic system’s rationale. Thus, socio-
economic education necessarily includes the develop-
ment of economic expertise taught by conventional 
economics. This expertise does not stand on its own 
though, but is rather augmented by the civic spirit and 
the capacity for ethical reflection. Civic spirit – in a broad 
sense – is the individual responsibility to shape the res 
publica and to implement the volonté générale as a 
social idea of a beneficial economic order. The capacity 
for ethical reflection is a necessary complement, but 
never a substitute for a substantiated economic 
education. It seems essential to investigate basic ethical 
issues concerning ecological, social and inter- as well as 
intragenerational justice of economic activities and not 
to approach the economic pursuit of ideal resource 
allocation by falling back to inacceptable extremist 
positions, namely mindless economism (which subordi-
nates every normative consideration to economic 
calculations and propagates liberal anarchy) and 
economically naive moralism (which confronts economic 
activity with unattainable moral postulates) (cf. Röpke 
1961, p. 184). This means that ethics and economics are 
not supposed to be pitted against each other, but to be 
reconciled by – or at least integrated into – the economic 
citizen. In order to fulfill this task, a mature economic 
citizen, being addressee and purpose of any economic 
education, has to have reflexive and professional 
competencies: He needs to (a) subordinate his actions to 
conditions of public welfare, (b) have the expertise and 
judgment to disenchant economic myths, and (c) develop 
enough moral judgment and competency to be geared to 
values, virtues and duties connected to this public 
welfare in economic and political contexts.  
 
a) The appeal to the term “citizen“ constitutes the 
liberal-republican core of the economic citizen. Busi-
ness acumen and civic spirit can be viewed as two 
competing conceptions of the term “citizen“. The 
bourgeois, following his business acumen, understands 
economic activity to be primarily a self-involved, quasi-
autistic action, only restricted by a state treaty. Aside 
from a civic-capitalistic corporate ethos and the 
attendant pursuit of self-interest, the civic virtues of 
this property-owning bourgeois do not reach beyond 
observing the law as a sign of good citizenship (cf. 
Schrader 2011, p. 309 – Ulrich 2008, p. 274). ULRICH 
contrasts this bourgeois with a conception of the 
economy being inseparably tied to politics and 
especially ethics. The politically mature citizen (citoyen) 
subordinates his economic activity to an expanded 
conditional legitimacy, which is not limited to a 
conformist behavior geared towards coercive norms—
underpinned by sanctions—of the regulatory frame-
work; he rather considers himself as a member of a 
community. On the one hand, this citizen is charac-
terized by the civic spirit mentioned earlier. This basic 
point of reference, incorporating the solidary and just 
social order of free and mature citizens, can be 
regarded as a republican guideline of the economic 
actor. Beyond this ethos, civic virtues are the navi-
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gation aid of economic activity and form the normative 
substructure of economic-efficient actions. ULRICH 
(2008, p. 342) recognizes the following formal minimal 
requirements for republican civic virtues: 
 
“–firstly, a fundamental willingness of the citizens 
to reflect on their preferences and attitudes involving 
a certain degree of self-critical open-mindedness 
which will enable them, if need be, to change their 
position; 
– secondly, a fundamental willingness to reach an 
agreement on impartial, fair principles and 
procedural rules regulating the deliberative process. 
A particular degree of good will is required for the 
clarification of this basic consensus, as the 
participants must be prepared to renounce the use of 
their power potential in the pursuit of their own 
interests; 
– thirdly, a willingness to compromise in areas of 
dissent which, beside the good will to arrive at a basic 
consensus on fair rules for finding compromises, also 
requires a permanent mutual acceptance of limited 
areas of disagreement; 
– fourthly, a willingness to accept the need for 
legitimation, i.e. the willingness to submit ‘private’ 
actions unconditionally to the test of public legiti-
mation. This includes the renunciation of an a priori 
privatism, adequate forms of ‘publicity’ and 
accountability for publicly relevant activities.” 
 
Embedded in his particular ‘lifeworld’, the economic 
citizen is faced with a multitude of possible role 
conflicts every single day. Thus, his civic spirit is called 
upon not only concerning political ballots, but also 
decisions of consumption and investment. It has to be 
developed in awareness of the fact that purchase 
decisions and portfolio strategies always imply political 
and social aspects, too, which can be reflected in 
substantial externalities like environmental damage, 
precarious labor conditions or violations of human 
rights. Moreover, globalization has caused such pro-
cesses to shift from local events to worldwide chains of 
interdependence, which an individual can hardly 
identify and assess without a high level of investment. 
Later on (cf. chapter 4), further locations of morality 
shall be addressed, which can (but not necessarily do) 
support the economic citizen in pursuing the civic spirit. 
His role as an organizational citizen, i.e., as a member 
of an enterprise bound by a labor contract, seems 
particularly demanding. In this case, it is imperative to 
conciliate—or, in a conflict situation, balance—the 
legally codified loyalty towards the employer with 
one’s own ethos and the civic spirit. Clearly confirmed 
by reality, the conflict situation’s individual solution 
boils down to a decision between three strategies: 
“exit“ (i.e., annulment of any contractual relations or 
membership), “voice“ (i.e., enunciation of the conflict 
and attempt to overcome it), or “loyalty“ (which often 
manifests as uncritical loyalty in the face of noticeable 
grievance) (cf. Hirschman 1970). Therefore, socio-
economic education in light of business ethics not only 
implies the ability to consider the ethical dimension of 
economic decisions, but also includes guidance for 
actions in ethical conflict situations. The phenomenon 
of whistle-blowing – widely discussed in the media – 
strikingly shows how moral conflicts in economic, legal, 
and political contexts can escalate. 
b) Beside their ethical expertise, economic citizens 
also need economic competence, of course. But 
responsible economic citizens are to be seen as ‘myth-
busters’. On the basis of critical-scientific values 
following Elias (2009, p. 53f), those citizens are versed 
in the ability of “replacing imagery of event 
interrelations, myths, belief systems and metaphysical 
speculations that cannot be confirmed by looking at 
the facts with theories, i.e., models of interrelations 
that can be checked, validated and revised by looking 
at the facts.“ From our perspective, this requirement is 
well-understood if it is sensibly translated to the 
citizen’s ‘lifeworld’, enabling him to check material 
logics and functional mechanisms—on whose premises 
he aligns his economic decisions and actions—for their 
functionality and normative content. Economics right-
fully claims to have contributed to the rationalization of 
the world by means of a strong formalism and 
subsequent modeling. Thus, criticism neither applies to 
economics as a scientific discipline nor to the necessity 
of imparting classical economic knowledge, but aims at 
a specific occurrence, which ELIAS (2009, p. 54) also 
cautions against: the transformation of scientific theo-
ries into belief systems, which--though acting as 
evidence-based sciences—want their own premises to 
be conceived as socio-scientific analogies to natural 
laws or metaphysical dogmas. A (compulsory) material 
logic that is deemed to be without alternative seems 
especially ominous when it burdens the citizen with 
moral obligations and operates under the assumption 
that these can be extracted from real events at the 
market via the normative force of facts. The principle 
of profit poses a very characteristic example; it encom-
passes – as necessarily specified guidance for action (cf. 
Löhr 1991, 91) – both a systemic functional mechanism 
of rational economic activity, deduced from reality, and 
a normative postulate for the individual, conveyed by 
the capitalistic corporate ethos (cf. Ulrich 1998, p. 2). 
Economic citizens embody this kind of ‘mythbuster’ if 
socio-economic education endows them with the 
requisite know-how and faculty of judgment required 
to expose the “natural-law-metaphysics of the market”, 
(cf. Ulrich 1997, 3ff.) as a cultural artifact, to challenge 
(compulsory) material logics, and to prevent his own 
economic actions to be unquestioningly based on laws 
of the market which seem to have no alternative, but 
to have these actions conditionally legitimized by 
society.  
c) As we understand it, the normative core of 
socio-economic education should be to prevent civic 
virtues and public welfare orientation from being 
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subordinated to the pure systemic logic of economics 
or even from being maneuvered into an irresolvable 
dualism. In this respect, being a mature citoyen means 
embedding the principle of economic rationality into a 
viable and beneficial context, thus eventually imple-
menting the Aristotelian triad of ethics, politics and 
economy (cf. Ulrich 2009, p. 8). From that point of 
view, market actors‘ individual liberties are not 
absolute but need to be conditionally legitimized in 
accordance with third-party entitlements (cf. 
Beschorner, Schank 2012). In line with these conside-
rations, a socio-economic education that propagates 
the possibility of value-free economic activities beyond 
inherent questions of equity, solidarity, and free and 
equal participation in forming the social and economic 
order is to be rejected.  
 
So far, the economic citizen has been characterized as 
receiver and product of a socio-economic education 
which encompasses both factual competencies and a 
basic moral attitude, which in turn needs special 
competencies to be implemented. His factual compe-
tence does not only encompass knowledge about eco-
nomic correlations, but also an understanding of the 
generation of this knowledge as a cultural product rather 
than a misconceived analogy of value-free natural laws. 
With every bit of knowledge about the normative 
content of economic activity, the orientation towards 
public spirit and civic virtues approaches the educational 
core ever closer. Now, the question is not only how 
values are to be created, but also for what and for whom 
(cf. Ulrich 2010, p. 31 – Ulrich 2008, p. 90). Special 
competencies are necessary to answer these significant 
questions independently. Thus, this last sub-item 
highlights the development of moral judgment com-
petence and decision-making authority.  
The molding of morally upright personalities is a well-
developed field of moral psychology and can be 
connected with considerations regarding a socio-
economic education reflecting business ethics. The goal 
is to support the individual actor in his struggle to 
integrate moral values and ethical rules of decision-
making into his own identity (cf. Windsor 2004 or Jagger 
2011). Moral knowledge, moral motivation and moral 
action cannot be consistently combined until this moral 
self (cf. Blasi 1984) has been confirmed. In order to 
enable economic citizens to decide and act with integrity 
within an economic context, the following competencies 
have to be supported in their development (cf. Knopf, 
Brink 2011, p. 20; Maak, Ulrich 2007, p. 480ff): 
 
1) Moral knowledge: One has to be informed 
about general norms, manners and customs in econo-
mic contexts as well as expected actions on those 
bases. (Example: Corruption is to be refused.) 
2) Moral judgment: One has to have the ability to 
analyze situations and actions regarding their moral 
content, i.e., one has to recognize whether a norm or 
obligation has to be applied due to prevailing morals. 
(Example: Accepting precious gifts in certain business 
relations constitutes corruption.) 
3) Moral competence of reflection: This signifies 
the central ability to justifiably check moral rules for 
their content, i.e., to reflect them ethically. This may be 
a matter of consenting to universal ethical principles. 
(Example: Corruption is immoral because it undermines 
trust and leads to misallocations of resources. 
Therefore, an administration and economy based on 
corruption is undesirable.) 
4) Moral courage: Tied to the competence of 
reflection is the ability to create and keep a skeptical 
distance from established and implemented norms. 
This ability is relevant not least because of the pressure 
of conformity within companies and branches of trade, 
which may demand non-reflective or uncritical 
behavior. (Example: The deliberate decision against 
corruptting actions, even if they are supported or 
demanded by one’s own employer.) 
 
In case these four competencies are combined, the 
economic citizen gains an unbroken identity—a 
prerequisite for consistent, upright and legitimate deci-
sions and actions along the lines of public spirit and civic 
virtues. 
If socio-economic education manages to convey 
economic expertise as well as moral judgment and also 
to allude to the necessity of every market action’s 
conditional legitimization by society, then the quali-
fication of mature economic citizens succeeds. They then 
are enabled to act literally with integrity, with unbroken 
wholeness, since their profit motive is set before a 
background of civic virtues. Such qualified citizens are 
less prone to place all social relations under the 
condition of economics and to regard society as a mere 
market attachment (cf. Polanyi 1978, p. 88f.).  
Equipped to such an extent, the economic citizen is 
capable of taking political and economic responsibility in 
mature and self-determined ways. Not only has he been 
enabled to navigate the economic system via his exper-
tise and his critical examination of economics‘ doctrines 
and propositions, but he also submits every economic 
action to the aspect of everyday life’s practical benefits.   
 
3 The economic citizen’s responsibility 
Beside the requirement to submit one’s economic 
actions to one’s own understanding as a citizen and a 
societal legitimization, the economic citizen is obliged to 
take responsibility for his actions, particularly in 
economic contexts. Before being able to discuss the 
economic citizen’s responsibility, the very meaning of the 
enigmatic term “responsibility” has to be established in 
the first place.  
In this context, “responsibility” is understood as a 
multidimensional, relational term. At any rate, respon-
sibility means that someone (1) has to account to a 
certain entity (2) for something (3). In the context of 
responsibility for economic actions, this entity is not 
necessarily an individual counterpart, but may be the 
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citizenry in general (or the res publica respectively). This 
generalization of the entity to which one is accountable 
gives consideration to the fact that there are two differ-
rent areas of responsibility in general: On the one hand, 
the citizens within a society are obviously responsible for 
their individual, immediate actions (or the neglect 
thereof). Since economic actions and circumstances are 
autonomously caused by intelligent individuals, those 
same individuals bear the responsibility. KANT already 
“anchors the moral and judicial accountability of actions 
to freedom” (Heidbrink 2003, p. 63); it is therefore 
indispensable for a socio-economic education to convey 
this connection of freedom and responsibility and to 
show prospective economic citizens the ever-present, 
essential possibility to take this responsibility, even in the 
face of alleged “inherent necessities” of economic acti-
vities (cf. Lorch 2014, p. 124-126) .  
Moreover, citizens can also be (co-)responsible for 
alterable states of society in terms of their civic duties: 
“People are responsible for all conditions which allow for 
human intervention and correction”, since “every 
alterable state needs justification” (Gosepath 2004, p. 
57). This means that every citizen can be held co-
responsible (by and to every other citizen) for changing 
unjust states of society, provided he is able to take part. 
The question is whether this is reasonable in every case, 
or whether it might be necessary to focus on addressees 
of accountability aside from the individual economic 
citizen. 
 
4 ‘Sites’ of morality as a heuristic approach to areas of 
responsibility 
So far, only the individual and his responsibility as a 
citizen in an economic system – viewed from a socio-
economic perspective – have been discussed. But the 
economic citizen is not the only entity to be addressed 
with issues of responsibility. Thus, within the scope of a 
socio-economic education, the interplay and reciprocity 
between different societal institutional actors and their 
responsibilities should be broached and conveyed. The 
reason being that especially in complex situations of 
decision-making, one cannot assume that all individuals 
are morally upright and competent regarding the 
subject; one should always expect to deal “with precisely 
such average human defects” (Weber 1919, p. 57). In 
case the burden of responsibility takes individuals out of 
their depth, other sites of responsibility have to be 
consulted. Hence, a social “organization of responsibility“ 
(Heidbrink 2003: 187) is required, which manifests in 
societal institutions that are indeed shaped by and filled 
with individuals, but whose basic existence is not bound 
to them. 
In addition to the individual, two of those institutional 
sites  are particularly relevant to economic issues and 
can be burdened with responsibility: the corporations 
and organizations as economic actors (meso-level) as 
well as regulatory politics, which institutionalizes econo-




Figure 1: Locations and relations of economic 
responsibility 
Before going into details concerning contexts sur-
rounding the cultural and natural environment, the 
meso- and macro-level are to be introduced. The econo-
mic citizen as an actor on the micro-level of individual 
ethics has already been discussed. 
 
a) Regulatory politics‘ initial problem is the strained 
relation between ‘lifeworld‘-aspects and systemic as-
pects of the market economy order. Therefore, its 
pivotal function is first and foremost to determine the 
role of the market within the societal framework. 
Regulatory politics has to check in which cases and 
under which conditions market competition gets per-
mission to be a societal system of coordination. In 
other words, it has to settle the question of which 
areas of society are to be governed by the market, i.e. 
by the principle of profit and economic rationality, and 
which areas are left to alternate logics. Upon finding 
those answers, it has to guarantee the establishment of 
institutional preconditions for a functioning and effect-
tive competition wherever – according to the first task 
– market should prevail (cf. Ulrich 2008, p. 350ff). 
Before regulatory politics can discuss how competition 
is to be shaped (second task), the question of the 
competition’s area of influence has to be decided (first 
task).  
Especially the second task emphasizes the interaction 
of regulatory politics and the two other locations of 
responsibility: Because of an increasing economization 
in many areas of life, economic citizens as well as 
corporations are faced with problems of reasonability 
within the field of tension between economic 
efficiency, personal moral integrity, and societal legiti-
macy.
5
 In such cases, there is a need for so-called 
“institutional backings“ (Ulrich 2008, 302), which offer 
the economic citizen an opportunity—via available 
frameworks—to act upright and take responsibility.  
Thus, the duty of regulatory politics should be to not 
only enable but also promote responsible and upright 
actions. One criterion for well-understood regulatory 
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politics is its orientation towards efforts of promoting 
upright economic actors (instead of individuals maxi-
mizing their own benefit, disconnected from any 
societal attachment). Regulatory politics has to shape 
the market economy in order to prevent those who 
take societal responsibility from having to put up with 
disadvantages; acting upright has to be reasonable, 
while acting only towards one’s own benefit should be 
illegitimate. Possibilities for individuals to establish 
these regulations are limited, which is why an 
institutional backup is needed – which in turn is deter-
mined by the commitment of the citizens.  
b) In addition to citizens and regulatory politics, 
corporations and other organizations within economic 
processes account for the third location of response-
bility.  
To what extent can corporations (being artificial 
entities) bear responsibility, and what should be their 
role in shaping a modern order of society? These 
questions had been raised even before the experiences 
of the financial and economic crisis and are extensively 
discussed in the current debates about Corporate 
Social Responsibility (CSR)
6
. At this point, two areas of 
corporate responsibility are to be highlighted: On the 
one hand, corporations bear responsibility for pursuing 
an upright business strategy, and on the other hand, 
they also bear responsibility for their part in shaping 
the regulatory framework, i.e., co-responsibility in the 
field of regulatory politics (cf. Ulrich 2008, p. 410ff).  
 
1) Upright business strategy (corporate ethics): A 
corporation that is integratively understood is a 
“pluralistic value-creation-activity” (Ulrich 2008, p. 
430), whose actions take public effect. Hence, a legiti-
mate and socially meaningful business strategy is 
required as a foundation. This calls for integrity within 
the corporation as well as regarding its external 
appearance. It is reflected by the corporation’s hand-
ling of antagonistic claims of different stakeholders (cf. 
basics by Freeman, Reed 1983; Freeman et al. 2010). 
Corporations acting with integrity will respect the 
claims of all their shareholders proportional to their 
reasonability. This holds true particularly concerning 
the protection of human rights in a company’s sphere 
of influence. 
2) Co-responsibility in branch-specific and regula-
tory politics (republican business ethics): Single corpo-
rations, however, are not always in a position to 
implement a beneficial conception of value creation, 
since they are again confronted with the issue of 
reasonability – a situation akin to that on the individual 
level. It is competition that structurally leads to 
(alleged) “inherent“ or “market necessities”, respecti-
vely. If the individual actor abstains (or intends to 
abstain) from profits for the benefit of an upright 
management, he has to accept competitive disadvan-
tages and is eventually even more exposed to the 
pressure of the market. These problems are often to be 
ascribed to failures of regulatory politics – binding, 
institutional backings are missing. However, upright 
corporations not only have a duty to not exploit those 
shortcomings, but to step into the breach in terms of 
the principle of subsidiarity in cases where the state 
does not intervene yet.  An example of this would be 
so-called soft law initiatives, establishing, inter alia, 
branch-specific agreements. At the same time, the 
individual economic citizen in his role as organization-
citizen bears an essential co-responsibility for the 
integrity of business activities. Thus, corporations are 
also tied to the other two levels of responsibility.  
It is the connection of the different levels of res-
ponsibility that is to be proposed as a possible heuristic 
to convey and reflect economic interrelations, forming 
the basis of a socio-economic education. In terms of a 
young people’s qualification for becoming an economic 
citizen, it facilitates the means to convey the liabilities 
on different levels and to uncover and deliberate 
alleged inherent necessities and dependencies. Aside 
from these three conventional levels of accountability, 
there are also contextual levels, which influence the 
allocation of responsibilities to the three discussed 
levels significantly. To conclude, these are to be added 
to the heuristic in order to complete it – the sphere of 
the natural environment on the one hand, and the 




Despite the classification provided in the last 
paragraph, the sphere of the natural environment can 
hardly be viewed as given, objective surroundings. 
Though natural resources and livelihoods like soil, water, 
air, and commodities are allegedly intersubjectively 
determinable, their perception is de facto embedded 
within social discourse and can vary significantly, 
depending on times, contexts or groups. In order to 
determine the areas of responsibility, pivotal aspects of 
the natural environment are to be considered:   
 
- the basic relation between humans and their 
environment 
- existence and perception of the shortage of 
natural resources 
- significance of quality of life as defined by the 
condition of the natural environment 
- assumptions about the extent of economic 
growth being a socially and economically 
desirable factor, in spite of detriments to the 
environment 
 
The socio-cultural sphere is disproportionately more 
extensive, since it is comprised of every cultural product 
and every cultural technique. Particularly prominent 
examples include: 
  
- systems of norms and values within societies 
and social groups 
- socio-demographic distribution of age, sex, edu-
cation, income, etc. 
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- culture of political participation and political opi-
nion 
- society’s cultural dimensions of attitude (cf. 
Hofstede 2001) 
- technological status and availability 
- infrastructure regarding education, mobility, 
bureaucracy, telecommunication and market 
 
These aspects of the spheres of the socio-cultural and 
the natural environment constitute the backdrop for the 
actions of the bearers of responsibility as well as for the 
determination and balancing of their adoption of 
accountability. This is also an indication of values, duties 
and virtues neither being unaffected by time nor being 
intersubjective factors; they are negotiated under differ-
rent social conditions. 
 
5 Imparting socio-economic education against the 
Background of an inductive approach and the three-
level-model 
In our view, the teaching of socio-economic education 
(general, tertiary and quaternary) has to avail itself of a 
broad, method-pluralistic canon of didactic instruments 
which can show the complexity of situations of economic 
decisions and work out solutions. Not only does it 
provide a basic knowledge regarding facts, decisions and 
reflection (as is demanded within general education), but 
it can also have a share in challenging and correcting 
objectives that have been identified as problematic in 
tertiary and quaternary education (“profit first”). To this 
day, especially the management education is still to be 
characterized by a lack of empathy concerning ethical 
issues (cf. Mitroff 2004; Ghoshal 2005). Following the 
idea of discourse ethics, we particularly accent forms of 
education which demand and promote its central 
subjects: dealing with conflict, criticism, dialogue and 
discourse, i.e., being able to solve problems via reflection 
and—whenever possible—via reasoning based on dis-
course. Using the heuristic of the three levels of morality, 
it has been shown that in such cases, reflection always 
includes viewing the issue from different standpoints, 
conducting thought experiments. The learner is to be 
enabled to contemplate complex circumstances from 
different perspectives. Thus, the heuristic supports socio-
economic education, particularly concerning problems 
which seem to be ill-defined: 
“An ill-defined problem is one that addresses complex 
issues and thus cannot easily be described in a concise, 
complete manner, e. g. those with multiple, non-
guaranteed solutions. Furthermore, competing factors 
may suggest several approaches to the problem, requi-
ring careful analysis to determine the best approach. An 
effective technique for developing problem-solving and 
critical thinking skills is to expose students early and 
often to ‘ill-defined’ problems in their field” (Euler, 
Seufert 2011, p. 220). 
This centrality of complex problems points to two 
implications concerning the concrete organization of 
learning units: Although the teaching of purely factual 
economic knowledge plays a crucial role, it is not the 
dominating factor. One should opt for didactic tech-
niques that help to reflect on problems and aid in 
developing possible actions. We discern two steps: 
Socio-economic education has to be (partly) inductive 
by dealing with the concrete experiences of the students 
(cf. Ulrich 1996, p. 22). In this regard, a student-centric 
approach is characterized by illustrating and discussing 
problems from a student’s perspective instead of 
deductive-abstract teachings. General-education-studen-
ts as well as quaternary-education-students are to deal 
with their own role, their logic of action and their 
dilemmas before venturing forth. The reflection of one’s 
own situation should not be shortened or inhibited by 
teaching ready-made values and norms.
8
 An inductive 
approach is successful if it carves out a student’s basic 
awareness of the problems, illustrates dilemmas and 
points out (previously unperceived) courses of action.  
An inductive approach requires a micro-perspective 
viewpoint, examining the student as consumer, investor, 
member of an organization, entrepreneur or voter, 
thereby focusing on intra- and (depending on the com-
plexity of a given situation) interpersonal role conflicts. 
The particular value of the three-level-heuristic, how-
ever, lies in going one step further, prescinding from 
one’s own position to allow for a multi-perspective 
examination. Per actors’ involvement on the meso- and 
macro-level, relation networks, dependencies and inter-
sectoral conflicts become apparent. The student is 
supposed to recognize which actors may articulate a 
legitimate stake or can palpably enforce an effect in a 
given situation. By aiming for a change of perspective in 
class and encouraging students to consider the logic of 
action and target systems from the actor’s point of view, 
one can make a substantiated decision about the actors‘ 
inevitable or possible responsibilities (or even actions). 
At the same time, interdependencies between actions 
and their respective effects are exposed.  
A socio-economic education constituted in this way 
requires a didactic toolbox that specifically accounts for 
both dialog-oriented experimental learning and dis-
courses. An exhaustive overview of possible techniques 
is – within the limitations of this article – neither possible 
nor meaningful. Conventional conveyance of knowledge 
should be complemented with case studies and debating. 
Case studies allow for the depiction of problematic 
situations from different perspectives as well as 
problem-focused learning. Here, a selection of cases 
either immediately connected to the students’ ‘lifeworld’ 
or forcing a change of perspective is possible. Various 
forms of debating – two rivaling teams arguing about a 
given topic under specified stipulations – hold similar 
potential. Conducted as a competition in Anglo-Saxon 
school systems, debating can be used not only as a 
means of content reflection, but also in order to convey 
dialogue competence.  
The so-called service learning, which combines learning 
in school or university with real-world experiences and a 
service to society, offers great potential for the 
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conception of socio-economic education as outlined in 
this chapter. It is a form of learning “that meets 
identified community needs and reflects on the service 
activity in such a way as to gain further understanding of 
course content, a broader appreciation of the discipline, 
and an enhanced sense of civic responsibility” (Bringle, 
Hatcher 1996, p. 2). It outstandingly complies with the 
need for an inductive approach, since it helps reflecting 
and scrutinizing values and norms by confronting one’s 
own ‘lifeworld’ with those of others (cf. Butin 2005, p. 2). 
It offers pluralistic perspectives – one’s own value system 
cannot be conceived as isolated since third-party claims 
and logic of action have to be taken into consideration. 
Thereby, the teaching of basic economics can be 
transformed into concrete, real-world experiences by 
means of any form of school or tuition. Thus, specialized 
learning, individual experiences and societal actions 
coincide with each other. American business schools still 
play a leading role in enabling societal effects of 
economic actions to be visualized, reflected and experi-
enced during structured service-learning courses (cf. 
Kreikebaum 2011, p. 158f.). 
 
6 Conclusion and prospects  
Socio-economic and economic-ethical education are 
joined in a common concern. Both strive not primarily for 
a more intensive, but for a better basic economic edu-
cation that takes effect beyond disciplinal borders and 
applies to concrete problems. Citizens educated in such a 
way are not supposed to act – within markets or 
(allegedly) economized areas of life – more efficiently or 
with a higher degree of economic rationality, but to be 
upright, reasonable and responsible.  
This article tried to illustrate how portentous terms like 
integrity, rationality, and responsibility can be fleshed 
out via the concept of the economic citizen and the 
heuristic of interlaced areas of responsibility. It should 
again be stressed that the economic citizen, too, requires 
a well-founded acquaintance with classic-orthodox as 
well as heterodox economic theory. The knowledge of 
economic interrelations cannot be substituted by an 
exclusive teaching of business ethics. Even if ethics can 
be viewed as a corrective for uninhibited economism, it 
cannot replace economics and exchange economic 
expertise with ignorant moralism. Thus, the economic 
citizen that is alluded to is versed in economic theory and 
possesses competence regarding economic actions. But 
his additional benefit lies in his ability to tie economic 
rationality to a higher reason – he aspires to a beneficial 
economic activity whose roadmap is the civic spirit and 
whose means of navigation are civic virtues and ethical 
competencies. Moreover, he – as a ‘mythbuster’ – is 
capable of searching allegedly value-free economic 
approaches for their normative content. If this major 
goal can be reached, the socio-economic education can 
foster economic citizens who understand successful 
economy to be a means, but never an end to a well-
ordered society of free and equal citizens.  
Although business ethics can point to an increasing 
level of activity during the last few years, this path has 
only been treaded reluctantly. That is no surprise, since 
business ethics as a genuinely scientific discipline with a 
high degree of theoretical advancement (especially in the 
German-speaking world) is still a relatively rare subject, 
even at universities. Nevertheless, the fact that business 
ethics is highly relevant when it comes to the very 
practice of economy provides incentives for school and 
university education. Various concepts of an experience-
based competence learning (cf. Maak, Ulrich 2007, p. 
486ff.) have the potential to find their way into 
education and teaching. Developing these new measures 
in order to advance economic education can be viewed 
as a mutual assignment to be taken by socio-economics 
and business ethics.  
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 All German quotes in this text were translated analogously by the 
authors  
2
 See BRODBECK (2011) for an overview of economics as normative 
science. 
3
 See LEISINGER (1997, 141ff.). 
4
 By now, the classification of business ethics into a micro-level 
(individual ethics), meso-level (business ethics), and macro-level 
(regulatory ethics) is widely agreed upon, although the terms for the 
three levels may vary (cf. Enderle 1988, citing Göbel 2006, 79). 
5
 Gary S. BECKER (1976) provides an impressive example of the 
intrusion of economic logic as the dominating explanatory approach to 
human behavior into areas of life that were once exempt from  
dominance by the economic logic. 
6
 For an overview of the current state of the debate about Corporate 




 The new St.Gallen Management-Model follows a similar approach (cf. 
Rüegg-Stürm 2005). 
8
 Such a risk might, for example, emerge from an (uncritical) adoption 
of a code of conduct regarding certain occupations or roles, like the 
manager‘s oath, which has been propagandized in recent years (cf. 
Khurana 2009). 
